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I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, in perti-
nent part, provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation."1 The Supreme Court has
consistently held regulations which are so onerous as to deprive an
owner of all beneficial use of his property amount to a taking within
the language of the fifth amendment.2 The Court has also concluded
that when government has only temporarily exercised its right to use
private property, compensation is constitutionally required for the
1. U.S. CONST. amend V.
2. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076
(1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987);
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time of the government's interference. 3 However, the Court left un-
decided "whether abandonment by the government requires payment
for the period of time during which regulations deny a landowner all
use of his land."4
The Court confronted this question in First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County.5 In this case, the Court, in a
decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concluded that when
the governmental entity's actions have effected a taking of all benefi-
cial use of private property, "no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period dur-
ing which the taking was effective."6 Thus, the Court in First English
Church allowed a landowner whose property was affected by a zoning
ordinance to maintain a cause of action for monetary damages in in-
verse condemnation even though the regulation was only temporary.
According to the Court, invalidation of the ordinance, unaccompanied
by compensation, is a constitutionally infirm remedy.
This Note will examine the Supreme Court's holding on this con-
troversial issue. First, the Note will discuss the prior judicial decisions
concerning temporary regulatory takings and their impact upon the
initial resolution of the present case. Second, the posture of First Eng-
lish Church's inverse condemnation claim will be examined, including
a discussion of whether the claim was ripe for adjudication. This dis-
cussion will briefly contrast the pleading defects in the previous cases
reviewed on the remedies question with First English Church's claim.
Third, the Note will analyze the rationale underlying the Court's hold-
ing on the just compensation requirement. This analysis will begin
with an examination of the striking similarity between regulatory tak-
ings and other takings. The just compensation analysis necessarily will
include an examination of the reasoning, or lack thereof, for the inval-
idation remedy as the sole remedy for aggrieved landowners. Implicit
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v.
New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
In determining whether governmental regulatiod of property constitutes a
"taking," the Court has primarily relied on ad hoc factual inquiries into the par-
ticular circumstances of each case. Three significant factors are examined (1)
"the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant"; (2) "the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations"; and
(3) "the character of the governmental action." Id. at 124.
In contrast, however, the Court has applied a per se rule of unconstitutionality
in cases in which the regulation required the claimant to suffer physical occupa-
tion of a portion of his property by a third party. Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
4. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2387 (1987).
5. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
6. Id. at 2389.
[Vol. 67:435
TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS
in this analysis will be the arguments advanced for the compensation
remedy as the constitutionally prescribed remedy. Finally, the Note
will examine the possible ramifications of this decision for land use
planning procedure.
II. BACKGROUND CASES
Prior to First English Church, in cases involving inverse condem-
nation,7 the California courts declared that a government entity's ex-
ercise of police power,8 however arbitrary, could not, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, constitute a taking for which compensation
was required.9 Under the rule announced in Agins v. City of
Tiburon,O the proper remedy for an aggrieved landowner whose
property has been affected by regulatory action is declaratory relief or,
perhaps, mandamus. In the California courts' view, by maintaining an
inverse condemnation claim, a landowner could force the legislature
to exercise its power of eminent domain.ll Under this formulation,
compensation is not required until the challenged regulation or ordi-
nance has been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or in
an action for a writ of mandamus, and the government has neverthe-
less decided to continue the regulation or ordinance in its unduly re-
strictive form.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Agins, which emphati-
cally denied any claim seeking monetary relief for an unduly restric-
tive land use regulation, introduced a high degree of uncertainty into
accepted takings jurisprudence. The rule in Agins insulates govern-
mental entities from paying compensation to landowners whose prop-
erty has been confiscated by regulatory fiat. Further, Agins draws
7. The term inverse condemnation refers to an action brought by a property owner
to obtain just compensation when the state has taken his property but has not
instituted formal condemnation proceedings. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S.
253, 257 (1980). Inverse condemnation differs from eminent domain in that the
landowner initiates the action rather than the government. The process is thus
the inverse of a formal condemnation proceeding. Id.
8. Governmental police power is generally defined as the power to regulate human
activity in order to promote public health, saftey, welfare, and morals. Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
9. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 641-42 (1981)(Bren-
nan, J., dissenting); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28,
157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375 (1979), qff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
In Agins, the California Supreme Court expressly disapproved Eldridge v.
City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1979), a court of appeal's
decision holding "a valid zoning ordinance may nevertheless operate so oppres-
sively as to amount to a taking, thus giving an aggrieved landowner a right to
damages in inverse condemnation." Id. at 621, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
10. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
11. Id. at 276, 598 P.2d at 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
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into question whether any form of regulation may effect a taking
within the definition of the fifth amendment.
The California approach in Agins, however, has become increas-
ingly isolated. Six United States Courts of Appeals, 12 the United
States Court of Claims,'3 and six state supreme courts' 4 have adopted
the reasoning and analysis of Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego.15 Other jurisdictions have also
reached the Brennan conclusion.16 The Nebraska Supreme Court ap-
pears willing to consider compensatory remedies.17
The United States Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider
the merits of the Agins rule in four cases prior to First English
Church.'8 The Court, although acknowledging "the importance of the
question whether a monetary remedy in inverse condemnation is con-
stitutionally required in appropriate cases involving regulatory tak-
12. Bank of America v. Summerland County Water Dist., 767 F.2d 544, 547 (9th Cir.
1985); Nemmers v. City of Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 474 U.S. 121 (1985); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1982); Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038,
1043 (11th Cir. 1982); Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
13. Jentgen v. United States, 657 F.2d 1210, 1212 (Cl. Ct. 1981).
14. Corrigan v. City of Scottsdale, 149 Ariz. 538, 541, 720 P.2d 513, 516 (1986); Pratt v.
State, 309 N.W.2d 767, 774 (Minn. 1981); Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590,
599, 432 A.2d 15, 20 (1981); Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505, 510 (N.D.
1983); Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133, 140 (R.I. 1983); Zinn v.
State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 428-29, 334 N.W.2d 67, 72-73 (1983).
15. 450 U.S. 621, 657 (1981)(Brennan, J., dissenting). "[O]nce a court finds that the
police power regulation has effected a taking, the government entity must pay
just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first ef-
fected the taking, and ending on the date the government entity chooses to re-
scind or otherwise amend the regulation." Id. at 658.
16. Hermanson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 P.2d 694 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979); Clif-
ton v. Berry, 244 Ga. 78,259 S.E.2d 35 (1979); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Duggan,
95 Ill. 2d 516, 449 N.E.2d 69 (1983); Osborn v. City of Cedar Rapids, 324 N.W.2d 471
(Iowa 1982); Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698, 594 P.2d 671
(1979); Hamilton v. Conservation Comm'n, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 359, 425 N.E.2d 358
(1981); Knight v. City of Billings, 197 Mont. 165, 642 P.2d 141 (1982); Village of
Willoughby Hills v. Corrigan, 29 Ohio St. 2d 39, 278 N.E.2d 658 (1972), cert de-
nied, 409 U.S. 919 (1972); Suess Builders Co. v. City of Beaverton, 294 Or. 254, 656
P.2d 306 (1982); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978).
17. State v. Mayhew Prods. Corp., 204 Neb. 266, 281 N.W.2d 783 (1979). In Mcyhew, a
state statute prohibited placement of advertising signs along any interstate high-
way without prior written permission from the Department of Roads. The court
stated that an aggrieved sign owner may lawfully require payment of just com-
pensation for the removal of advertising signs erected prior to the statute in a suit
for inverse condemnation. Id. at 269, 281 N.W.2d at 785.
18. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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ings,"19 declined the invitation to conclusively decide the issue.20
Thus, the inconsistent state approaches and the lack of any definitive
federal approach inevitably have led to tensions between jurisdictions
and further have impinged upon the constitutionally protected rights
of landowners.21
III. FACTS OF FIRST ENGLISH CHURCH
The United States Supreme Court decided First English Evangeli-
cal Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County22 against this backdrop.
The case is somewhat atypical of challenges to land use regulations
because the case does not involve a large developer corporation.
Nearly thirty years ago, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale purchased a twenty-one acre tract of land in the Los Angeles
National Forest along the banks of the Middle Fork, just outside of
Los Angeles, California. The Middle Fork is the natural drainage
channel for a watershed owned by the National Forest Service. Over
half of First English Church's parcel was flat land with improvements,
including a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a caretaker's lodge, an out-
door chapel, and a footbridge across Mll Creek. On this site, First
English Church operated a campground, Lutherglen, as a retreat
center for parishioners and a recreational area for handicapped chil-
dren of all denominations. 23
In the summer of 1977 tragedy struck the campground. A forest
19. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2565-66 (1986).
20. Yet the Supreme Court, even in opinions in which it failed to reach the merits of
Agins, appeared willing to require compensation for the interim period that regu-
lation effected a taking. In San Diego Ga, Justice Brennan's dissent was joined
by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell. Justice Rehnquist, in his concurrence,
stated he had "little difficulty in agreeing with much of what [was] said in the
dissenting opinion" if he was satisfied the appeal was from a final order. San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,633-34 (1981)(Rehnquist,
J., concurring). See also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 106 S. Ct.
2561, 2569 (1986)(White, J., dissenting).
21. The constitutional aspect of land use law was in a state of chaos. For instance, the
California court in Agins held no damages were available for regulatory takings,
while the Ninth Circuit held to the contrary. Martino v. Santa Clara Valley
Water Dist., 703 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983). In
New England, New Hampshire and Rhode Island allow compensatory relief, Bur-
rows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d 15 (1981); Annicelli v. Town of S.
Kingstown, 463 A.2d 135 (R.I. 1983), but the First Circuit follows the Agins rule,
Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 621 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1980).
The commentary is replete with inventive descriptions of the chaotic state of
the law. For a brief listing of some of the terms used, see Berger & Kanner,
Thoughts on the White River Junction Manifesto: A Reply to the Gang of Five's
Views on Just Compensation for Regulatory Taking of Property, 19 LOY. L.A.L.
REv. 685, 692 n.31 (1986).
22. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
23. Id. at 2381.
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fire denuded the hills upstream from Lutherglen. The fire destroyed
approximately 3,860 acres of the watershed area and created a serious
flood hazard. A severe storm dropped eleven inches of rain in the wa-
tershed area and caused flooding in February 1978. The runoff from
the storm overflowed the banks of Mill Creek, flooding Lutherglen
and completely obliterating the campground's buildings.24
In response to flooding in the canyon, Los Angeles County adopted
Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 in January 1979.25 The ordinance pro-
vided that "[a] person shall not construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge
any building or structure, any portion of which is, or will be, located
within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood protection area
located in Mill Creek Canyon." 26 The ordinance included the flat ar-
eas on either side of Mill Creek on which Lutherglen had previously
stood. Several years later, after more study, the county made this pro-
hibition permanent.2 7
Shortly after the ordinance was enacted, First English Church filed
suit in a California trial court against the county and the Los Angeles
County Flood Control District. First English Church alleged, inter
alia, that the ordinance denied First English Church all use of Luther-
glen and sought damages in inverse condemnation for the alleged dep-
rivation.28 In a decision based squarely on Agins, the trial court
granted the county's motion to strike the allegation that First English
Church had been denied all use of Lutherglen, holding "when an ordi-
nance, even a non-zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the total use
of his lands, his challenge to the ordinance is by way of declaratory
relief or possibly mandamus." 29 Since First English Church alleged a
regulatory taking and sought only damages, the allegation was deemed
entirely immaterial and irrelevant and was summarily dismissed.30
Subsequently, First English Church appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, alleging the rule in Agins violated the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.31
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Los Angeles County, Cal., Ordinance 11,855 (Jan., 1979).
27. Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE 22.44.220, 22.44.230 (1979); Los Angeles
County, Cal., Ordinance 12,413 (Jan., 1979).
28. The first claim alleged the defendants were liable for dangerous conditions on
their upstream properties that contributed to the flooding of Lutherglen and that
denied appellants all use of their land. The second claim sought to recover from
the flood district in inverse condemnation and in tort for cloud seeding during the
storm that flooded Lutherglen. The sole claim preserved on appeal, however,
was the inverse condemnation claim. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2382 (1987).
29. Id.
30. The Supreme Court of California denied review. Id. at 2383.
31. This Note, however, will focus entirely on the fifth amendment violation.
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The United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision,32 held that, on
the facts of the case, the California courts had decided the compensa-
tion question inconsistently with the requirements of the fifth amend-
ment. The Chief Justice's opinion reasoned that temporary
deprivations of use, if sufficiently exacting as to effect a taking, "are
not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitu-
tion clearly requires compensation." 33 Thus, the Court held that an
aggrieved landowner may recover damages for a regulatory taking
even though the taking is only temporary.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Ripeness for Review
In order to analyze the Court's holding in First English Church,
the plaintiff's inverse condemnation claim must be examined. The
central issue for this inquiry is whether the question of remedies was,
in fact, squarely presented.
In four previous cases, the Supreme Court was unable to reach the
remedies issue because defects in the pleadings left preliminary ques-
tions unresolved or because the appeal was not from a final judg-
ment.34 Examination of these cases provides useful contrast to
highlight the sufficiency of the pleadings in First English Church.
First, in Agins v. City of Tiburon,35 the appellant acquired five
acres of unimproved land for residential development. The city en-
acted two ordinances modifying existing zoning requirements,
downzoning appellant's property, thereby restricting building to be-
tween one and five residential units on the tract of land. The appel-
lants, however, never sought city approval for development of their
land. The Court affirmed the holding of the California Supreme
Court, stating the land use laws, on their face, did not take the land-
owner's property without just compensation.3 6 The Court concluded
the uses permitted on paper were facially reasonable, advancing legiti-
mate state interests. Additionally, the owner was not denied all eco-
nomically viable use of his land, although it was unclear what uses
would eventually be permitted.3 7
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamil-
32. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court; Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, Powell, and Scalia joined in the opinion. Justice Stevens wrote
a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined.
33. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2388 (1987).
34. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
35. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255 (1980).
36. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 259 (1980).
37. Id. at 261-62.
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ton Bank,3s an owner of a tract of land being developed as a residential
subdivision sued the planning commission, alleging application of vari-
ous zoning laws and regulations to the owner's property amounted to a
taking of that property. The Court held that the respondent's claim
was not ripe because the owner had not obtained a final decision re-
garding the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision regu-
lations to its property nor utilized the procedures Tennessee provided
for obtaining just compensation. 39 The Court noted the respondent
had submitted a plat for development of its property, passing beyond
the Agins threshold. However, the respondent failed to seek variances
that might have been granted to make the subdivision viable, notwith-
standing the commission's finding that the plat submitted did not com-
ply with the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations.40
Similarly, in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,41 a
landowner who submitted a tentative subdivision map to the planning
commission which subdivided part of the subject property into 159 sin-
gle-family and multi-family residential lots brought suit seeking de-
claratory and monetary relief in inverse condemnation. The
California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's demurrer.42 The
Court was unable to reach the merits of the remedies question absent
a final and authoritative determination by the planning commission as
to how it would apply the regulations at issue to the property in ques-
tion. The Court could not determine whether a taking had occurred
or whether the county failed to pay just compensation. 43
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,44 the utility
acquired a 412 acre parcel of land as a possible site for a nuclear power
plant. The utility sued in inverse condemnation for just compensation
when the city downzoned 214 acres of the tract from either an indus-
trial use or an agricultural holding category to an open space designa-
tion. The trial court awarded damages but dismissed the mandamus
claim and the California Court of Appeal affirmed.45 The California
Supreme Court, however, vacated the Court of Appeal's decision and
retransferred the case to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in
light of the intervening decision in Agins.46 On appeal, after subse-
38. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
39. Id. at 186.
40. Id. at 187-88.
41. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
42. Id. at 2563.
43. Id. at 2568-69.
44. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
45. I& at 626-27. A jury trial on the question of damages resulted in a judgment for
the utility company for over three million dollars. Id. at 627.
46. Id. at 628. The Court of Appeal on retransfer reversed the judgment of the trial
court, relying on Agins' holding that a landowner could not recover compensa-
tion through inverse condemnation and holding that factual disputes precluded
declaratory relief. Id. at 629-30.
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quent proceedings, the Court concluded, while the Court of Appeal
decided monetary compensation was not an appropriate remedy, it
was unclear whether any other remedy was available because it had
not been decided whether any taking occurred. Thus, the Court held
that the appeal was not from a final order and the Court lacked
jurisdiction.47
These four cases uniformly reflect the Court's insistence on a de-
terminative answer concerning the nature and extent of permitted de-
velopment before adjudicating the constitutionality of limiting
recovery to invalidation of the offending regulation. In the handful of
cases decided this decade, pleading defects left unresolved the ques-
tions of finality-whether the regulation is a taking or whether the
appeal is from a final order.
First English Church's claim, however, was held properly
presented and ripe for adjudication on the merits. The county never
challenged the sufficiency of First English Church's claim that the or-
dinance precluded all use of Lutherglen. The county's argument in
support of its motion to strike the allegations focused exclusively on
the materiality and relevancy of the allegations as pleaded. In af-
firming the decision to strike the compensation component of the
complaint, "the Court of Appeal assumed that the complaint 'sought
damages for the uncompensated taking of all use of Lutherglen by
County Ordinance No. 11,855.' "48 The court below relied solely on the
proposition set forth in Agins; the remedy for a taking is limited to
declaratory (nonmonetary) relief. Thus, even if the facts as pleaded
were true,49 the Court of Appeal concluded the allegations were en-
tirely immaterial and irrelevant. The rejection of First English
Church's claim did not rest on the falsity of the allegation.5 0 There-
fore, the disposition of the case on these grounds isolated the remedial
question for the Court's consideration.5 1
The dissent by Justice Stevens, however, argued that the Court
"reached out to address an issue not actually presented in [the]
case,"5 2 stating the complaint at most assumed, arguendo, a constitu-
tional violation had been alleged.53 The dissent pointed out that the
47. Id. at 633; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
48. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2384 (1987).
49. First English Church's complaint alleged the facts, rather than legal theories, as
required by California civil practice. Brief for Appellant at 2 n.3, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)(No. 85-
1199).
50. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2384 (1987).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 2390 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2391.
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Court had the authority to decide the case by holding the complaint
did not allege a taking under the United States Constitution, thus
avoiding the novel constitutional issue.M
The dissent discounted the fact that the California courts relied
solely on the Agins rationale. The county never alleged the insuffi-
ciency of the allegations. Rather, the county assumed such facts were
immaterial and irrelevant under Agins and could never support an in-
verse condemnation claim. Thus, the posture of the case preserved
the issue of remedial damages on appeal. Since the Court of Appeal
assumed a taking occurred because of the flood plain ordinance, the
Court was able to finally address the merits of Agins-Whether com-
pensation for a temporary regulatory taking is constitutionally re-
quired under the fifth amendment. 55
B. The Just Compensation Requirement
Because First English Church was ripe for adjudication, the Court
finally reached the merits of the Agins rule, a rule which had evaded
the Court's review for seven years.5 6 In order to better understand
the Court's analysis of the just compensation requirement for unlaw-
ful takings of private property through good faith regulation, several
aspects of the Court's treatment of regulatory takings and the just
compensation clause must be examined. First, the regulatory takings
cases will be analyzed, focusing on the cases' similarity to the physical
occupation cases. This analysis will include the requirements for a
regulatory taking, the similarity of regulatory takings and the other
takings, and the similarity of permanent and temporary takings. Sec-
ond, the nature and scope of the constitutional proscription requiring
just compensation for takings of property will be examined. In this
constitutional analysis, the general limitation placed upon government
will be highlighted, and the Court's constitutional treatment of state
legislation which favors compensation will be discussed. Next, policy
considerations supporting compensation will be outlined. Finally, the
invalidation remedy and the rationales espoused in Agins and its prog-
eny will be critiqued.
1. Physical Occupation, Regulatory, and Temporary Takings
Current takings jurisprudence divides the cases into one of two
types: the physical occupation cases, and the regulatory cases. In phys-
ical occupation cases, the state physically intrudes upon private prop-
54. Id.
55. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The fifth amendment is made applicable
to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
56. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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erty either through a direct trespass or by authorizing others to do the
prohibited acts. The Court has consistently held such takings compen-
sable.57 Regulatory takings, on the other hand, refer to any taking of
private property through governmental regulation, either by legisla-
tive or administrative bodies.58 The Court has been more reluctant to
find that a governmental regulation constitutes a compensable
taking.5 9
Despite the different approaches to physical and regulatory tak-
ings, the term "taken," as defined by the Supreme Court, seems to
apply to both types equally. For instance, in United States v. General
Motors Corp.,60 the Court defined the term "taken" as follows:
[Tihe term 'taken' would seem to signify something more than destruction, for
it might well be claimed that one does not take what he destroys. But the
construction of the phrase has not been so narrow. The courts have held that
the deprivation of the former owner rather than the accretion of a right or
interest to the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental action short of
acquisition of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as
to deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to
amount to a taking.
6 1
As "taken" is defined, there is a remarkable similarity between physi-
cal occupation cases and regulatory takings.
The leading case addressing regulatory takings is Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon.62 In Mahon, a coal company sold the surface rights
to particular parcels of land but expressly reserved the right to extract
all the coal beneath the surface. Subsequent to this conveyance, the
Pennsylannia legislature enacted the Kohler Act, prohibiting any
mining that caused subsidence of any house, unless the house was
owned by the owner of the underlying coal and was more than 150 feet
from another's improved property. Because the Act made it commer-
cially impracticable to mine the coal, thereby essentially destroying
rights the claimant reserved from the surface owner, the Court held
the Act constitutionally invalid as effecting a taking without just com-
pensation.63 Thus, the Court recognized that regulatory takings are
compensable in the same manner as physical takings if the regulation
goes so far as to deny the owner all economic use of the property. In
reaching that decision, the Court stated: "The general rule at least is,
that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."64 Determining whether
a taking has occurred is "a question of degree-and therefore cannot
57. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
58. 1 P. NICHOLS, NICHOLS' ON LAW OF EmNENT DoMAIN % 1.42 (3d ed. 1985).
59. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
60. 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
61. Id. at 378 (footnote omitted).
62. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
63. Id. at 414-15.
64. Id. at 415.
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
be disposed of by general propositions." 65 The Mahon Court flatly re-
jected the possibility that police power regulations could never be cog-
nizable under the fifth amendment.66
Under Mahon, in conjunction with recent case law,67 police power
restrictions, such as zoning ordinances and other land use regulations,
may be so onerous as to destroy the possession, use, or disposition of
property as effectively as formal condemnation or physical invasion of
the property.68 It "matter[s] little whether... [the property owner's]
land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regulation
to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to deprive him of
all beneficial use of [the property]." 69
In First English Church, the Court recognized the similarity of reg-
ulatory takings to physical occupation cases and held that a temporary
taking is compensable under the just compensation clause. The Court
relied heavily upon a series of cases arising out of extraordinary
events in World War II. In those cases, various agencies of the federal
government temporarily confiscated and occupied the plaintiffs'
properties. In each of the cases, the Court reviewed the proper com-
pensation for the temporary physical occupation of the property for
governmental purposes. In reaching its decision on the amount of
compensation due the landowners, the Court stated its fundamental
precept: the owners are entitled under the fifth amendment to com-
pensation for the limited, finite period that the government deprived
them of their property.70
The temporal nature of the taking is not really at issue. The just
compensation clause includes no qualification requiring the govern-
ment to compensate landowners whose property is taken for a public
use if such property is confiscated permanently, as opposed to tempo-
rarily. Due to the absence of any temporal qualification in the fifth
amendment, there can be no constitutional basis for denying an owner
compensation for the temporary taking of his property. The tempo-
rary nature of the taking does not defeat the takings claim, nor does it
65. Id. at 416.
66. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 n.16
(1981)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979);
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
68. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)(the regulation de-
stroyed one of the most essential "sticks in the bundle" of property rights-the
right to exclude others).
69. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1981)(Brennan,
J., dissenting).
70. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); see also United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
[Vol. 67:435
1988] TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS
make the taking any more constitutional.T' In prior decisions, the
Court acknowledged that when government temporarily took use of a
building, land, or equipment, the takings clause is triggered and the
Court must then determine the appropriate measure of just compen-
sation.72 In current takings jurisprudence, compensation is designed
to restore the aggrieved landowner to the position he would have been
in but for the confiscation.73
2. Nature and Scope of the Constitutional Proscription
The fifth amendment provides, in pertinent part, "private property
[shall not] be taken for a public use, without just compensation." 74
Current takings jurisprudence is predicated upon the belief that gov-
ernment may take private property but must condition the act upon
the payment of just compensation. Thus, the proscription in the just
compensation clause is not against taking property; rather, the clause
prohibits taking property without compensating the owner for the
loss.
When an action for the taking of private property has been initi-
ated, either by eminent domain or inverse condemnation proceedings,
71. There is no hierarchy among incidents, no degrees of ownership. There
is a partial taking of property if possession is removed, and use and dispo-
sition remain; if use is removed, and possession and disposition remain;
or if disposition is removed, and use and possession remain. Nor is there
a requirement that the loss of the incident be total; partial losses of sin-
gle incidents may determine the measure of damages but may not negate
the taking.
R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoumAnN
62 (1985).
72. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
73. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934). "In principle the ideal situation is to
leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the
government and retention of the property." R. EPSTEIN, supra note 71, at 182.
After all, the clause was designed to bar the government from forcing some indi-
viduals to bear burdens that, in all fairness, should be borne by the public as a
whole. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See also Berger, A
Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165 (1974); Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just
Compensation Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1171-72, 1226 (1967).
State and lower federal courts may find substantial guidance in the rules for
valuation in temporary physical takings in those cases which determine the
proper measure of monetary relief for future revocation or amendment of regula-
tions. E.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
Generally, when the government condemns the property of a private party,
the just compensation clause does not require payment of replacement cost
rather than fair market value, which prevents the owner from receiving a wind-
fall. United States v. Fifty Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979). Thus, some of the more conjec-
tural claims for damages by owners whose property has been taken by regulation
will similiarly be disallowed due to quantification problems in valuation.
74. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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"the landowner has already suffered a constitutional violation, and the
'self-executing character of the constitutional provision with respect
to compensation' is triggered." 75 A principled reading of the clause
reveals that once a taking for public use has occurred compensation is
constitutionally required. The Court has consistently observed that
the just compensation requirement is not precatory. Although arising
in various factual and jurisdictional circumstances, the Court's deci-
sions recognize that it is the Constitution itself that dictates the rem-
edy for any interference with private property which constitutes a
taking.76 In Jacobs v. United States,77 the petitioner brought an action
to recover compensation when a governmental dam project caused in-
termittent overflows onto his land, resulting in the creation of a servi-
tude. The Court stated:
The fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted and that the right
was asserted in suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested upon the
Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary. A promise to
pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay
imposed by the Amendment.
78
Since Jacobs, the Court has frequently noted that, in the event of a
taking, compensation is grounded in the Constitution itself and not
dependent upon the proceeding.79 The fundamental question in fifth
amendment takings cases, after all, is how to fairly distribute the eco-
nomic costs involved.
Moreover, the Court has consistently held a legislative act is pre-
sumed constitutional, not void. The Court has interpreted legislation
which would be unconstitutional if it did not provide compensation as
requiring compensation. This construction upholds, rather than in-
validates, the legislation.0
The landmark case for this proposition is Hurley v. Kincaid.81 In
Hurley, the Court reversed an injunction against a threatened uncom-
pensated taking of property. Justice Brandeis' reasoning coupled the
consitutional preference for upholding legislation with the traditional
precepts of equity.8 2 The sole defect in the government's scheme was
its failure to compensate, yet compensation could be procured in an
75. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654 (1981)(Brennan,
J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 655 n.21 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(quoting United States v. Dickinson, 331
U.S. 745, 748 (1947)).
77. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
78. Id. at 16.
79. E.g., Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).
80. Brief for Appellant at 20, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los An-
geles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)(No. 85-1199).
81. 285 U.S. 95 (1932).
82. See also Kanner, Inverse Condemnation Remedies in an Era of Uncertainity,
1980 Inst. on Planning, Zoning & Eminent Domain 177, 197-206.
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action at law. Injunctive relief was unavailable because an adequate
and complete legal remedy existed to cure the taking and the legisla-
tion could be upheld if the Court inferred a provision to compensate.
Recently, the Court reaffirmed this line of analysis in two deci-
sions. In Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co.,83 the Court stated: "Equitable
relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking of private property
for a public use, duly authorized by law, when a suit for compensation
can be brought against the sovereign subsequent to the taking."8 4
Thus, the Court concluded that the Tucker Act was an available rem-
edy for any uncompensated taking suffered as a result of governien-
tal regulation.
The second recent decision is United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes,8 5 which explained the rationale for denying injunctive relief.
A unanimous Court said that the maxim against equitable relief rests
on the principle that so long as compensation is available for those
whose property is taken, the governmental action is not unconstitu-
tional.8 6 The Court found there was no justification to curtail the gov-
ernment's program if compensation would be available when a taking
occurred. Thus, as a matter of consitutional consideration, the proper
remedy for a prima facie taking is just compensation.8 7
Besides the unambiguous command of the just compensation
clause requiring compensation and the Court's prior holdings that
compensation is constitutionally mandated, compensation for a taking
is premised upon sound public policy considerations. The long-stand-
ing policy to defer to legislative choice whenever possible is the foun-
dation of many decisions on a host of subjects, ranging from urban
redevelopment,8 8 to railroad bankruptcies,8 9 to the Iranian hostage
crisis.9 0 Because legislative entities must confront a wide variety of
issues to promote public interests, only as a last resort should the
courts invalidate what the legislature has decided to enact. 91 This po-
sition is predicated upon the fundamentals of our three-tiered govern-
mental structure. The delicate balance of power would be upset if the
83. 467 U.S. 986 (1984)(disclosure of trade data for pesticides pursuant to a FIFRA
provision).
84. Id. at 1016 (footnote omitted).
85. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
86. Id. at 128.
87. This view is supported by analogy to other constitutional contexts. Comment,
Just Compensation or Just Invalidatio: The Availability of a Damages Remedy
in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 UCLA L. REv. 711, 723 (1982). See Biv-
ens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)(damages remedy for a
fourth amendment violation). See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)(fifth
amendment for sex discrimination).
88. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
89. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974).
90. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 673 (1981).
91. Berger & Kanner, supra note 21, at 708-09.
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judiciary felt free to disregard considered legislative enactments and
invalidate such judgments routinely, as a matter of first resort.
If invalidation were the sole remedy for regulatory takings, inquiry
would result in an all or nothing proposition. Either the government
is stopped in its tracks as the representative of the community or the
claimant's constitutional rights in private property are seriously jeop-
ardized.92 Neither choice is acceptable.
Compensatory relief, however, defers to legislative discretion by
permitting the legislature to choose the path it deems best. Once a
court determines a regulatory taking has occurred, the government
has a range of options from which to choose. The legislature can aban-
don the regulation, amend the regulation, or continue the regulation
and pay damages to the aggrieved landowner. Thus, compensatory re-
lief defers to legislative discretion rather than compels legislative
action.
3. Critique of the Invalidation Remedy
Invalidation as the only remedy for a regulatory taking is not only
constitutionally suspect for the reasons outlined above, but the relief it
purports to give is mostly illusory. In our adversarial system, the
court renders its opinion after the regulation already has had the ef-
fect of taking private property and inflicting economic loss. In First
English Church's situation, which is typical, the property has been re-
stricted for a number of years, denying its owner all use of the prop-
erty in the interim. The practical effect of the county's ordinance was
to make Lutherglen the natural drainage channel for the watershed
area upstream. Even if the court invalidated the ordinance, First Eng-
lish Church's real damages for the period during which the regulation
was in effect are demonstrable and significant. What possible use
could a campground and recreational area have been since the flood if
construction of any buildings to house the participants was prohib-
ited? The violation that First English Church suffered is not reme-
died when a court, after lengthy litigation, tells the government to
cease and desist its unconstitutional activity. Invalidation merely dis-
continues the original deprivation. Although the regulation is no
longer in effect, the invalidation remedy does not address economic
losses suffered during the life of the regulation, even though such
losses can be substantial.
Contrary to the California court's fears that an owner could force
the legislature's hand, an owner under the compensation remedy only
recovers compensation between the time the ordinance effected a tak-
ing and the time the ordinance is rescinded. The compensation is lim-
ited to the time during which the taking already occurred.
92. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 (1949).
[Vol. 67:435
TEMPORARY REGULATORY TAKINGS
Not only does invalidation as the sole remedy do little for the ag-
grieved owner, the rule is prone to abuse by the government. Invali-
dation, after all, only directs the governmental entity to draft a new
regulation; the courts do not mandate the governmental entity adopt
any particular regulation in its stead. The owner is thus continually at
the mercy of the regulator. 93 The regulator's ploy is to change the
regulation slightly and invite future litigation under that classifica-
tion. For example, if the court invalidates a regulation restricting cer-
tain property to single-family units, the owner, desirous to use the
property for commercial purposes, brings suit. The entity, after an ad-
verse judgment, will immediately rezone the property to a slightly dif-
ferent use and invite the owner to spend another couple of years and
thousands of dollars litigating the new classification.94 Under this sys-
tem, the only effects of the invalidation decree are skyrocketing litiga-
tion costs and squandering judicial time and resources.
Few, if any, property owners can outlast the regulator because time
is on the regulator's side. Eventually, the property owner will suc-
cumb to the pressure and discontinue the suit. It is amazing that a
church would have the patience and economic resources to pursue its
claims against the county after so many years of litigation. Fre-
quently, the government, although it may have lost every judicial bat-
tle, emerges victorious. Such a system, brimming with unfairness, is
inconsistent with general notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Any disincentive to unconstitutional conduct on the part of the regula-
tor is entirely absent and the aggrieved landowner is left without an
effective remedy for the unconstitutional taking. Because it is prone
to such serious abuse, the invalidation remedy offers little hope to the
property owner caught in the morass of litigation, escalating costs, and
deprivation of beneficial use of his property.
Despite the plethora of problems associated with the invalidation
remedy, three grounds are advanced for denying compensation for
regulatory takings. Proponents of the invalidation remedy allege that
compensation would usurp a legislative function, bankrupt local trea-
suries, and inhibit necessary land use measures. Each of these con-
cerns will be addressed, yet each, as it will be shown, lacks empirical
support. Concern for governmental welfare cannot and should not
overwhelm the express prohibition against uncompensated takings.
Under the rationale in Agins, awarding compensation for regula-
93. Brief for Appellant at 22, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los An-
geles County, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)(No. 85-1199).
94. R. BABcOCK, THE ZONING GAME 13 (1966). This ploy was discussed by a former
city attorney and author of a prominent text on land use regulation at the 1974
annual conference of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in Califor-
nia, the remarks were reprinted in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Di-
ego, 450 U.S. 621, 655 n.22 (1981)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion effecting a taking usurps the legislative function of promoting the
public good, thereby compelling the legislature to transmute an exces-
sive exercise of the police power into a lawful taking.95 However, this
argument is without support. It is questionable whether a damages
remedy restricts a regulatory entity's options more severely than in-
validation. Under the damages remedy, the regulating entity can ana-
lyze all the relevant considerations and weigh the appropriateness of
each. The entity may decide to acquire the land outright, continue the
regulation in effect and pay the landowner damages, or simply aban-
don the regulation altogether. No legislative function is usurped
under the damages remedy. In fact, invalidation may usurp the legis-
lative decision making process by compelling the regulating body to
rescind the offending ordinance.
The second argument in support of invalidation is equally unmer-
itorious. The major economic objection to extending liability to regu-
lating entities is fear that such bodies will be subject to unexpected
and severe costs, disrupting essential public programs to pay the own-
ers whose property was appropriated by regulation. Budgetary and
political pressures exasperate these concerns. Thus, some courts and
commentators are leery of extending liability in land use disputes
where the stakes are high.96 They fear that the additional strain on
financial resources and the greater risk of liability may render many
municipalities unable to provide public programs.
These dire financial predictions, however, were rejected in Owen v.
City of Independence,97 which extended liability to municipalities for
damages caused by violations of constitutional rights, on the grounds
that there was no empirical support for such predictions. Due to the
exigent requirements for showing a taking under current jurispru-
dence, municipal liability for such conceptually defined excesses
"pales in comparison to the general tort liability deemed acceptable in
Owen."9 8
Even if the fiscal disaster of extending liability was supported by
empirical evidence, such concerns are secondary in any analysis. The
cost of constitutional compliance is not an acceptable basis to justify
denial of constitutional rights. Can anyone support infringement on
criminal rights, for example, because the cost of extending due process
is increasing? Surely not. The same analysis equally is applicable to
the just compensation clause. The just compensation clause, unlike
95. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276,598 P.2d 25,28,157 Cal. Rptr. 372, 375
(1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
96. The claims are often in the millions of dollars, and even in the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. Comment, supra note 87, at 724-32.
97. 445 U.S. 622, 656 (1980)(tort suit by a police chief against a municipality and its
officers).
98. Comment, supra note 87, at 727.
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many constitutional provisions, is clear in its command: private prop-
erty shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. De-
nying compensation for pragmatic reasons is a constitutionally infirm
approach.99
Further, the damage remedy only shifts the cost of governmental
regulation from the individual owner to the public at large. Even if
catastrophic judgments are possible, it only confirms the fact that indi-
vidual owners have been subjected to huge uncompensated losses. In
all fairness, these losses should be borne by the community which ben-
efits from the regulation. If, however, the disproportionate impact
upon the individual owner is adjudged minimal, then the community's
cost of enforcing that regulation will be similarly insignificant. The
cost on either side of the equation must be identical. Yet, the commu-
nity's costs may be proportionately distributed among its members,
while the individual owner must bear the entire cost alone. The prin-
ciples of equity compel the governmental entity to award compensa-
tion to the aggrieved landowner.
Third, the proponents of invalidation as the sole remedy argue that
compensation awards would "chill" local planners, rendering them in-
effective. As Justice Stevens, in dissent, warned: "Cautious local offi-
cials and land use planners may avoid taking any action that might be
challenged and thus give rise to a damage action. Much important reg-
ulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety
area."10 0 The fear of liability, it is argued, will have far-reaching im-
pact. These fears are further compounded by the uncertainty as to
whether a regulation will effect a taking.101 Because the Court has no
set formula to decide whether a regulation crosses the threshold from
a legitimate exercise of the police power to a prima facie taking, local
planners will be fearful of enacting even the most fundamental land
use regulations.
This fear of planner impotency, however, is severely misplaced and
overstated. Liability should promote more rational decisions. Plan-
ners will think twice in marginal cases in which regulation interferes
99. The value of a property interest, either large or small, does not provide an appro-
priate yardstick for measuring the scope of the constitutional proscription. Tex-
aco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 540-41 (1982)(Brennan, J., dissenting). The
sovereign has no license to take property without paying for it simply because the
property is inexpensive. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 436-38 (1982). The government also may not refuse to pay because the
property is fairly expensive. After all, the fifth amendment "draws no distinction
between grand larceny and petty larceny." Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2089
(1987)(Stevens, J., concurring).
100. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2399-2400 (1987)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3163 (1987)(Stevens, J., dis-
senting)("Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainity
about the scope of this Court's takings jurisprudence.").
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with property owners' reasonable expectations. Planners in those
marginal cases will tend to err on the constitutional side. This will
give the planners an added incentive to make more efficient use of
their resources. They will be imputed with knowing, like all officials,
the bounds of their authority. As Justice Brennan noted in San Diego
Gas & Electric Co., "[i]f a policeman must know the Constitution, then
why not a planner?"102
Further, the entire concept of "chilling" governmental conduct is
based on an unsound rationale. Much of the planning inhibition
charge is premised on substantial fiscal liability arising from a damage
remedy, which, as previously discussed, is erroneous. Thus, to fear sti-
fling planning activity is to engage in speculative reasoning, lacking
empirical support. The effect of compensation will be healthy and
pose a minimal fiscal threat to planners.
C. Implications for Land Use Planning
First English Church, by requiring compensation for temporary
regulatory takings, raises important implications for land use planning
procedures. The Court's decision should eliminate many of the abu-
sive planning techniques previously employed by the various state and
local commissions and agencies.
The most fundamental ramification on the planning process will be
on the use of a general land use moratorium. Although the Court's
decision did not address directly the continued validity of land use
moratoria, 103 the Court strongly implicated that its use as a govern-
mental exercise gives rise to compensation because the distinction be-
tween brief physical takings and brief planning delays is severely
strained. If permissible delays (delays not subject to compensation)
are limited to those types reasonably necessary to process applications,
then most moratoria will fall within the purview of the Court's tak-
ings analysis for unduly restrictive regulations.104 The reasoning for
this conclusion is highlighted by comparing the dissent's three dimen-
102. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981)(Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
103. The Court refused to consider whether "normal delays in obtaining building per-
mits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" should be compensa-
ble takings. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County,
107 S. Ct. 2378, 2389 (1987). Rather, the Court limited its holding to the facts
presented. Id. The Court's failure to clarify its opinion invites conjecture. Be-
cause the Court did not distinguish a normal delay from an excessive delay, and
because Nollan v. Caifornia Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), increases the
likelihood a regulation will amount to a compensable taking, planners' temporary
denial of use due to procedural delay may trigger compensation.
104. R. Best, New Constitutional Standards for Land Use Regulation: Portents of
Nollan and First English Church 7 (July 22, 1987)(unpublished manuscript from
the Pacific Legal Foundation).
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sional test for when a regulation effects a taking0 5 with the majority's
opinion. This comparison will suggest which, if any, form of morato-
rium can survive this decision and not be held a compensable
taking.106
Because the dissent acknowledged that "[a] temporary interference
with an owner's use of his property may constitute a taking for which
the Constitution requires that compensation be paid,"107 both the ma-
jority and the dissent agreed the temporary operation of some regula-
tions may be so onerous that invalidation will not mitigate the
regulation's effect. The two opinions differ in the likelihood that a
regulation will amount to a taking. Regulations prohibited under the
dissent's three dimensional test must be more restrictive before the
just compensation clause is triggered than those prohibited under the
majority's view.
Thus, any land use moratoria, in order to withstand a challenge
under this decision, must at least survive the dissent's more limited
test for determining whether a taking has occurred. Any moratorium
covering substantial amounts of property for an indefinite period in
order to achieve a general planning purpose will be highly susceptible
to a temporary takings claim, even under the dissent's more restrictive
view.108
Because of possible exposure, a planning commi sion's use of
vague, broad restrictions to achieve ill-defined public purposes with-
out any specific time frame are seriously jeopardized under First Eng-'
lish Church. This decision casts doubt on whether such abusive
practices by planning commissions will be allowed. Planning commis-
sions must become more self-disciplined to avoid the risk of liability.
This decision effectively eliminates the use of general building mora-
toria because losses from such delays may be substantial and restora-
tion of an allowed use will not mitigate the losses suffered during the
regulation's life. In order to escape liability, the commission should
alter procedures for enacting a moratorium. In the future, planners
will spell out more clearly specific public purposes that can be
achieved only by imposition of a restriction. The days of imposing
building restrictions virtually at whim are over because damages such
105. Regulations are three dimensional; they have depth, width, and length.
As for depth, regulations define the extent to which the owner may not
use the property in question. With respect to width, regulations define
the amount of property encompassed by the regulations. Finally...
regulations set forth the duration of the restrictions.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2394 (1987)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. R. Best, supm note 104, at 11.
107. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2393 (1987)(Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
108. R. Best, supra note 104, at 12.
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restrictions inflict now are held compensable in an inverse condemna-
tion proceeding.
The second implication for planning procedures deals with the date
used in assessing the amount of damages recoverable. The Court, in a
prior decision, stated that when the government physically occupies
land without condemnation proceedings,"the owner has a right to
bring an 'inverse condemnation' suit to recover the value of the land
on the date of the intrusion by the Government.' '109 Extending this
analysis for physical takings to regulatory takings, the Court con-
cluded that, although an unlawful taking does not occur until the gov-
ernment refuses to compensate the owner, "the interference that
effects a taking may begin much earlier, and compensation is mea-
sured from that time."110 Thus, the date on which the government
first interfered with the owner's property rights is the starting date
for compensation. No matter "when the ultimate act occurs which
consummates the taking, liability may extend to a 'much earlier' date
when the interference with the use of the property first started."111
Even though normal delays for plan approval or submission of a vari-
ance do not effectuate a prima facie taking independently, they will
be calculated in the time for which compensation is due if the applica-
tion of the regulation ultimately amounts to a taking.112
Planning commissions, mindful liability may extend to a much ear-
lier date, will eliminate lengthy interim restrictions and other normal
planning delays. Such abusive procedures and regulatory tools will be
replaced by self restraint or, at least, more well-defined delays be-
cause, if the ultimate regulation rests upon a specified public purpose
achievable only through the restriction imposed, such delays will not
attach to any regulation ultimately held to be a taking. Thus, the First
English Church rule will effectively eliminate many abusive planning
techniques because the risk of liability will promote more rational de-
cisions and use of planning commissions' resources will be enhanced.
V. CONCLUSION
Because of the striking similarity between temporary regulatory
takings and temporary physical takings, the Constitution demands
just compensation be paid to owners whose property is confiscated
temporarily through police power regulations. A principled reading of
the just compensation clause reveals that once a taking for public use
has occurred, compensation is constitutionally required, and does not
depend upon the proceeding initiated. The fundamental purposes of
109. Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 5 (1984).
110. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S. Ct.
2378, 2389 n.10 (1987).
111. R. Best, supra note 104, at 8.
112. Id. at 8-9.
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the fifth amendment, after all, are to fairly distribute the economic
costs involved and limit governmental flexibility.
Awarding compensation for regulations effecting a taking does not
usurp a legislative function and does not bankrupt local treasuries.
Compensation does not inhibit local planning because the fifth amend-
ment isesigned to limit the flexibility of governmental authorities.
Although the Court is mindful of these concerns, the cost of constitu-
tional compliance never can be an acceptable basis to justify denial of
consitutional rights. Invalidation, unaccompanied by compensation, is
a constitutionally infirm approach.
This decision will have positive effects on planning because many
abusive planning procedures will be discontinued. The use of general
land use moratoria is strongly implicated as a governmental exercise
giving rise to compensation. In light of this decision, planning com-
missions necessarily will be more self-disciplined and think twice in
the marginal cases. Not only will compensation be awarded for the
life of the unduly restrictive regulation but compensation may date
back to the time the government first interfered with the owner's
property. This decision, because of the risk of liability, should sound
the death knell for unabashed attempts by regulators to continually
frustrate property owners.
Joseph C. Vitek '89
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